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Abstract: Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) plants are a promising technology of renewable energy 
production, as witnessed by the increasing public and private investments during the last decade. The 
assessment of the associated risks of business interruption (loss of production) and loss of assets due to the 
occurrence of undesired internal or external events, such as failures of components, unfavorable 
environmental conditions, etc., brings added values by informing design modifications and contributing to 
production assurance, for rational Company investments in these environmentally sustainable power plants. 
This work presents and applies a methodology for assessing the risks associated to a CSP of innovative 
design. The methodology is derived from traditional system risk analysis, specifically focused only on the 
economic consequences of the internal events of failure behavior of components. The innovation in the 
design considered is particularly aimed at augmenting the CSP intrinsic capability of being equipped with 
thermal storage systems by the introduction of a molten salt mixture as heat transfer fluid. This technology 
presents evident advantages in terms of system simplification and reduction of production costs but on the 
other hand introduces a risk factor with regards to the solidification of the salt mixture that occurs at about 
240°C.  
Keywords: Concentrating Solar Power plant, Molten Salt Mixture, Hazard Scenarios, Hazard Identification 
(HAZID) Analysis, Quantitative Risk Analysis, Business Interruption, Loss of Assets. 
1 Introduction 
In the current scenario of global warming and global competition in the energy market (mainly driven by the 
limited availability of fossil fuels), in the last years a growing attention has been paid to the renewable 
energies and associated technologies, by both politics and the scientific community worldwide. In this 
context, the European Union (EU) commission presented in 2007 a strategic overview on the European 
Energy Policy measures, which puts particular emphasis on the use of renewable energies and on the 
development of new technologies to exploit the potential of alternative energies, with the objective of 
reducing the dependency on energy import, boosting industrial competitiveness and promoting economic and 
social development [1]. In the report, the EU commission identifies the CSP technologies as potentially 
significant contributors to the development of a more sustainable energy system, predicting that these 
technologies will play a key role in meeting the target of supplying 20% of the total EU energy demand by 
renewable energies. Coherently with this vision, the EU commission has been supporting research in CSP 
technologies for several years, with notable results, and established new specific funding instruments for 
support of their development [2]. This has led to the design and building of a number of pilot plants with 
different technological solutions in different parts of South Europe and North Africa, some of the most 
„solar-fit‟ regions of the World. 
Although the technological developments are encouraging, the full growth of CSP plants is still undermined 
by a number of practical aspects, the most important being the relatively high final cost of produced energy 
that limits the competitiveness of such plants. In view of this challenge, Techint-Compagnia Tecnica 
Internazionale (in the following referred to as Techint) embraced an innovative and promising CSP 
technology (based on a technology development program carried out by Ente Nazionale per le Nuove 
Tecnologie l‟Energia e l‟Ambiente, ENEA), which is expected to guarantee higher power generation 
performances than those of other competing CSP technologies. Based on the analysis of this technology, 
Techint is prepared to invest in the development and construction of these plants for commercial 
exploitation.  
The strategic direction of investment calls for the rational answer to three questions: 
 How will the plant actually perform? 
 How can one guarantee the reliability/availability requirements? 
 Is the development risk sustainable from the economic point of view? 
The first question arises naturally from the general uncertainty on the success of novel technologies, due to 
lack of experience and the too few lessons that can be learnt from little similar operating plants. To address 
this question, a scaled-down pilot plant has been designed and is planned to be built on the site of Massa 
Martana (Italy); the observed generation performances of the pilot plant are expected to contribute to 
reducing the uncertainties on the selected technology, increasing the Company confidence on the economic 
viability of the investment program. 
The answer to the second question requires the development and application of Reliability, Availability and 
Maintainability (RAM) analyses, taking into account the peculiarities of the plant and the characteristics of 
the site of installation. With respect to the latter, in fact, the Company investment program foresees to build a 
number of plants in different regions of the South Mediterranean area, characterized by different 
environmental conditions. 
The answer to the third question is the focus of the work presented in this paper, which reports about the 
research activity carried out in collaboration between Politecnico di Milano and Techint, for the development 
and application of a methodology for identifying and assessing the economical risks associated to the CSP 
plant operation, related to the occurrence of undesired events to its components. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the essential notions about the CSP technology 
selected by Techint. Section 3 provides a description of the risk assessment methodology and the results of 
the application of this methodology. Some concluding remarks and perspectives for future advancements are 
given in the last Section. 
2 The selected CSP technology: X-ITE® trough parabolic collectors  
The CSP plants, often also called Solar Thermal Power (STP) plants, can be divided into four classes: 
Fresnel Systems, Solar Towers, Dish/Engine Systems and Parabolic Troughs. All these plants produce 
electricity in much the same way as conventional power stations. The difference among them is that they 
obtain their energy input by concentrating in different ways solar radiation, and converting it to high-
temperature steam or gas, which then drives a turbine or motor engine. Differently from other solar 
technologies, the CSP plants can keep working at a constant load thanks to the thermal storage systems, 
whose main function is equivalent to that of the fuel in other power generation systems. This potentially 
leads to an optimal plant utilization with higher margins and shorter return of the investment, making the 
CSP technology particularly attractive for investors. 
The CSP plant type selected by Techint is based on the conventional parabolic trough, enhanced by 
innovative design solutions. Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the reference plant and of its key 
components: mirrors, receivers, thermal storage system and turbine. Roughly speaking, a parabolic solar 
collector tracks the Sun continuously and exploits the optical properties of the parabolic mirrors, which 
reflect the incident parallel rays in the optical focal line, to concentrate the Sun‟s rays onto a heat absorber 
element (the „receiver‟ in Figure 2). The solar radiation warms up the heat transfer fluid flowing through the 
absorber tube (up to 550°C in the reference plant), and the hot salt mixture is accumulated in the hot tank 
(this is technically called the „thermal storage charging phase‟, during which the level of the cold tank is 
reduced and the level of the hot tank is increased). When the delivery of electric energy is required a molten 
salt flow is spilled out from the hot tank, the fluid is conducted along a heat exchanger in which steam is 
produced and finally the cooled molten salt flow is re-collected in the cold tank (this is technically called the 
„thermal storage discharging phase‟: dually from the previous charging phase, the level of the cold tank is 
increased and the level of the hot tank is reduced). The produced steam generates rotating power in the 
turbines, which is converted in electrical power with an expected output of about 10-50 MW of electricity, 
depending on the rate design of the plant. 
The receiver adopted in the reference CSP plant represents a fundamental technological innovation, patented 
by ENEA and consisting of a specially coated absorber tube (solar absorbance of 95% and emissivity of 10% 
at 400°C) which is embedded in an evacuated glass envelope; the high photo-thermal properties allow 
achieving an high working temperature (580°C) and consequent high efficiency of the plant, with high 
mechanical reliability. 
The reflecting panels are also novels; they are made of a thin glass-silvered mirror coupled to a supporting 
panel in Sheet Moulding Compound (SMC); this solution combines the advantages of the glass mirror (a 
cheap and reliable reflecting material) with the improved mechanical properties of composite materials. 
Last but not least, also the heat transfer fluid is an innovative solution; it is a molten salt mixture (60% 
NaNO3 - 40% KNO3) operating at temperatures in the range of 290-550°C, assuring chemical stability up to 
600°C and which does not contribute to the degradation of the tubes. This innovation leads to several 
important aspects: the increase of the operating temperature from 390°C up to 550°C, with an increase of the 
thermodynamic efficiency; the reduction of storage costs consequent to system simplification and reduction 
of storage media inventory for the same amount of storage capacity; the reduction of the environmental 
impact of such kind of plants. 
3 Assessment methodology 
The methodology developed to assess the plant power generation performance is based on the framework of 
system risk analysis, focused on business interruption (loss of production) and loss of assets only (in other 
words, safety consequences are not considered). 
The analysis is made up of three main phases, which are detailed in the next sub-Sections: 
 modeling of the plant (its components, systems and functions); 
 hazards identification and failure analysis: the identification and analysis of the „hazardous‟ 
events/processes/parameters which may lead to assets losses and/or business interruptions;  
 quantitative analysis of accident scenarios leading to loss of production and assets. 
3.1 Modeling of the plant 
A full understanding of the engineering system to be analyzed is the first step of the methodology. Two 
techniques have been employed (further details about them can be found in [3]-[7]): 
 Block Diagram: a schematic representation of the hierarchical and logical relations linking the 
physical elements of the plant at any level of detail (also referred to as indenture level [5]; e.g., 
systems, subsystems, items). 
 Functional Analysis: a break down of the system functions through the different levels of detail; i.e., 
functions at indenture level „n‟ are decomposed into functions at level „n+1‟ [4]. 
Both these techniques are standard in system risk analysis, serving the purpose of providing a qualitative 
picture of the nominal physical behaviors of the plant components jointly with their mutual functional and 
hierarchical relations. The results of the application of these techniques feed the successive phases of the 
methodology: the unambiguous definition of the functions expected from the components implicitly defines 
what they should not do (i.e., the possible deviations from the nominal behavior), whereas the clear 
identification of their interfaces (input, output, environment, etc.) allows the identification of the 
„cause/effect‟ elements, at any indenture level, that in case of failure are affected by or could affect the 
considered components; this is, then, the input for the identification of the failure modes, effects and causes 
of the components. 
3.2 Identification of hazards and failure analysis  
Hazard is here defined as any real or potential condition that may result in a business interruption or may 
cause damage to or loss of assets. Therefore, hazards are not events, but are threats to assets and production 
that if triggered by specific initiator events have negative effects on the exposed properties, but if 
opportunely managed do not lead to any accident. The aim is then that of identifying effective methods for 
assisting engineers in coping with the hazards, i.e. in spotting out, classifying, eliminating and/or controlling 
them. Again, we remark that „safety-related‟ hazards, i.e., that may result in injury, illness, or death to 
personnel or damage to the environment are not taken into account in this analysis. 
Figure 4 sketches the conceptual framework of the analysis. The first step is the investigation of how and to 
which extent occurrences of failure events and/or deviations of process parameters can lead to business 
interruption and loss of assets. This step has been performed by thoroughly applying the HAZard 
IDentification method (HAZID) in successively refined and detailed design settings. HAZID is a qualitative, 
structured and iterative process commonly used in the framework of safety analyses ([6]-[8]). In our work, it 
has been adapted to the specification of identifying hazards to structures, systems and components and to 
qualitatively evaluating probabilities and potential consequences on production and assets, should the 
hazards actually be activated.  
With regards to the synoptic of Figure 4, the hazards in each area of the plant are first searched by a checklist 
of hazards (Preliminary Hazard List, [6] and [7]), prepared by a team of competent engineers coming from a 
mixture of disciplines and led by the risk analysts, experienced in the use of the HAZID technique. The 
preparation of the list reflects the experts knowledge, their lessons learnt and available standards (e.g., [4] 
and [7]). Notice that external hazards (earthquakes, tornadoes, sandstorms, etc.) have not been considered in 
the analysis, as both their frequency and magnitude heavily depend on the site of plant installation.  
Where it is agreed that an hazard exists in a particular area (i.e., an „Hazard Manifestation‟ has been 
recognized [4]), then the corresponding initiator event (i.e., an event that unleashes the potential inherent 
cause of the hazard and, either directly or indirectly, results in a damage to assets or loss of production) is 
identified jointly with its possible causes. Initiator events should be hunted out among the possible failures 
and defects of components, software errors, human errors, etc. Experts experience, lessons learnt, collection 
of failure data (e.g., [10], [11]) are again the knowledge sources that feed this part of the study. Notice that 
an hazard could be triggered by different initiator events leading to identical or different consequences. 
Once an hazard has been activated, the hazard scenario, which reflects the chain of events from causes to 
final effects, is outlined and the impact that these effects have on production and assets is evaluated. This 
entails investigation of the physical and functional layout of the systems and components of the plant, 
assessment of the mechanisms involving physical damage or functional failure propagation, and description 
of the physical and functional behaviors of systems and components in case of occurrence of the initiator 
events (the previous step of system understanding, functional and logical description aids such investigation). 
In particular, combinations of faults undetected before the initiator event, failures of the operator to act on 
demand, failures of components to operate throughout a specified interval, components unavailability due to 
testing or maintenance, dependent failures, concurrent activations of other hazards etc. should be considered 
in the definition of the hazard scenarios ([6], [8] and [9]). 
The frequency of occurrence of the triggering event and the severity associated to the consequences of the 
hazard scenario provide the basis for making the final decision about risk acceptability: this can be achieved 
by resorting to a risk matrix evaluation ([5], [8], [12]). 
A number of peculiarities, tailored to the objectives of the work, characterize this part of the analysis. First of 
all, the criteria used for deriving the risk matrix are innovative. More specifically, both the magnitude and 
frequency levels defining the risk criteria have been selected taking into account the expected lifetime and 
the estimated yearly revenues from the operation of the reference CSP plant. From the simulation performed 
considering the typical meteorological year for a  selected representative site and the actual electric energy 
tariffs, the X-ITE
®
 performance figures show a net yearly income of about 12.5 M€. Consequently, the risk 
levels have been tuned with reference to such value: an expected risk of business interruption and asset loss 
above this figure the risk is considered “High” ( 12.5 M€) and “Very High” if ten times this figure (125 
M€). On the other hand, if the expected risk is lower than 1.25 M€ it is considered “Low” and “Medium” in-
between. The individual severity and the frequency levels have been selected so as to obtain these limits 
(Table 1). 
Secondly, the frequency of occurrence relates to the initiator event instead of the final accident sequence. 
This approach is practical and conservative in that it leads to an over-estimation of the risks associated to the 
hazard scenarios; in fact, unless the initiator event is a Single Failure Point (SFP, i.e. the failure results 
directly in the final effect and is not compensated for by redundancies, alternative operational procedures, 
etc.), the hazard scenario is typically made up of a sequence of events (that may or may not occur) of 
frequency smaller than that associated to the first event of the sequence (details about the computation of the 
probability of sequences of events can be found in [8], [9], [12]). Moreover, the frequencies of the initiator 
events considered can be derived from commercial databases and entirely assigned to the failure modes that 
trigger the corresponding hazards; this also results in a conservative estimation of the frequencies of the 
initiator events because, actually, the frequencies should be apportioned among the different failure modes of 
the components and de-rated depending on the actual operating time, which is just an aliquot of the calendar 
mission time, e.g. because parts of the CSP plants do not work nightime. 
Finally, the quantification of the loss of assets corresponding to a given scenario is based on expert opinion 
whereas the estimation of the economic losses due to business interruptions is computed by multiplying the 
expected annual income from plant operation by the expected unavailability due to stoppage; both these 
estimations are made conservatively and lead to an over-estimation of the severity assigned to the hazard 
scenarios.  
The reasons for applying such conservatisms are driven by the peculiarity of the practical framework in 
which the analysis is performed. Process and design parameters, failure behaviors of the components, etc., 
are all affected by unknown uncertainties, which affect the final results of the analysis. On the other hand, 
the objective of the analysis is to provide elements of confidence to the investor about the performance of the 
plant, which conservatism can aid. 
The hazard scenarios which from the analysis turned out acceptable (i.e., of Medium and Low risk), lead at 
most to sustainable economic losses and do not need further investigations. On the contrary, a thorough 
quantitative analysis is required for those hazard scenarios which have come out unacceptable, aimed at  an 
accurate estimation of the frequency of occurrence and magnitude of their consequences, in terms of losses 
of production and assets.  
Table 2 presents a snapshot of the HAZID method applied to the CSP plant object of the present study. 
„Electrical Energy‟ is the hazard considered in the first row of Table 2; this manifests itself in the Solar Field 
and more precisely in the orientation system (i.e., the system that moves the parabolic collectors in order to 
track the Sun). A failure in the electrical network, caused by accidental events outside the plant, is the event 
that triggers the hazard scenario. This results in a black-out longer than 5-6 minutes, which is the time 
estimated by the expert for the molten salt to exceed the temperature safety limit of 600°C (mishap). The 
frequency of occurrence of this type of failure is inferred from data collected by the Italian electrical 
distribution utility. The high temperatures reached in this scenario damage the troughs and the final collector 
loops: this is the effect associated to the scenario. Considering the part of the plant which is exposed to this 
effect, an evaluation of the losses of production and assets is obtained. 
The HAZID method applied for the analysis of the CSP plant, has led to the identification of 113 hazard 
scenarios: 67 of these are associated to a Low risk level, 20 to a Medium risk level, 16 are unacceptable (15 
with an High risk level and 1 Very High): these scenarios, reported in the Critical Hazard List (CHL) of 
Table 3, have been subjects of detailed investigations in the successive phase of the methodology.  
3.3 Quantitative Analysis 
Based on the results of the hazard identification step, the proposed methodology focuses on the detailed 
quantitative analysis of those scenarios which have turned out not acceptable (Figure 4). The analysis aims at 
calculating more accurately the values of frequencies and severities assigned to initiator events and 
consequences, respectively. If the risk associated to the hazard scenarios is still not acceptable after 
performing the detailed, quantitative analysis, then an hazard reduction process is in order, to eliminate, 
reduce or control the hazard. In general, the detailed analysis identifies the vulnerable points upon which to 
act for hazard reduction, e.g., by removal of specific potentially threatening system characteristics, reduction 
of the amount of specific threats, prevention/reduction of the occurrence of undesired events and/or 
mitigation of their effects. For example, with reference again to the hazard „Electrical Energy‟ of the HAZID 
Table 2, complete hazard elimination (no electrical energy input) is not possible whereas the issue of hazard 
reduction (a more reliable electrical network) cannot be addressed by the design of the plant, and hazard 
prevention may be obtained by the insertion of redundancies or fail-safe systems in the design. 
For the systematic risk analysis and communication, each scenario of the CHL is reported in a Worksheet 
that contains the relevant information on the analysis and its results; this Worksheet is the input to design 
engineers for considerations of plant improvements. For example, the Worksheet associated to the hazard 
scenario of the HAZID in Table 2 is shown in Table 4. Its upper part recapitulates the main characteristics of 
the hazard scenario: the hazard manifestations at different indenture levels, the title name assigned to the 
hazard scenario, the current situation of the study (i.e., „opened‟ when the hazard scenario has been 
identified; „confirmed‟ when a team of experts has validated the plausibility of the hazard scenario; „closed‟ 
when the quantitative analysis has been performed all the way to verification of the acceptability of the risk 
and/or hazard reduction measures have been identified). 
In the middle part of the Worksheet, the hazard scenario is further detailed; in the example of Table 4, the 
physical description of the hazard scenarios reads that the stop of the orientation system is due to an 
electrical black-out and leads to tube ruptures only if the solar radiation is larger than a critical threshold of 
600 W/m
2
, considering that the sun motion requires almost 3.5 minutes to move out of the direct radiation 
zone, and if also the back-up energy system is failed.  
The feared events are summarized in the successive part of the Worksheet. In the hazard scenario considered 
in Table 4 there is no feared event at component level; in fact, the component in this case is the orientation 
system which is not in a fault status, it is simply not energy-supplied. On the contrary, at asset level there is 
the feared event of rupture of the tubes due to the high temperatures reached by the molten salt mixture 
(which is not flowing, as also the pumps are not supplied), and from the point of view of production loss the 
feared event is a significant decrease in power generation performance. 
In the Worksheet, it is also important to indicate the identified possible causes that concur in determining the 
occurrence of the initiator event, to steer the design toward devising solutions for eliminating or controlling 
them. To this aim, a detailed summary of the characteristics of the hazard scenario is provided; the frequency 
and severity levels of the scenario guide the direction towards which the analysis effort should be driven. 
„Frequency-driven‟ critical scenarios (those with high frequency levels) call for an investigation of the actual 
sequence of events leading to the final effect, whereas „severity-driven‟ scenarios require a detailed 
evaluation of the exposure of production and assets. Two elements of relevance for such analyses, and the 
associated fallbacks onto design are the propagation time and the detectability of the failures in the scenario. 
The latter indicates the capability of the current design under analysis of detecting the unleashing of the 
chain of undesired events; the former provides a measure of the time span between the occurrence of the 
initiator event and the realization of the consequences: a „yes‟ in the corresponding cell of the Worksheet 
signifies that there is enough time to act on the sequence of events that constitute the scenario, before its final 
effects are realized.  
The concluding section of the Worksheet details the quantitative investigations performed for the scenario 
considered. In particular, for the scenario in the Worksheet of Table 4, a first investigation consists in a 
refined estimation of the severity of the business interruption and loss of assets consequent to the considered 
scenario. In particular, the simpler and conservative initial analysis has been substituted by a detailed 
dynamic simulation, which takes into account the different positions of the individual receivers in each 
collector loop. In fact the receivers have different initial temperatures, ranging from 290°C to 550°C, and 
thus different exposition times needed to reach the temperature limit. Another effect that has been considered 
is that the temperature increase rate is lower at high temperatures. As a result of the detailed simulation study 
performed, the estimation of the severity of business interruption and loss of assets turns out drastically 
reduced, but not sufficiently to reach the safe zone (i.e., Medium and Low risk). A second investigation 
consists in a detailed probabilistic analysis for estimating the frequency of occurrence of the final accident 
consequent to the hazard scenario under analysis: in the example of Table 4, this accident is treated as the top 
event of the Fault Tree (FT) that models the logic relations of the events involved in the hazard scenario 
(assumptions and explanatory comments on the analysis are provided in the Worksheet). In the case at hand, 
the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been performed by using the BlockSim
®
 software tool, and verified by 
independent calculations. Typically, the Worksheet ends with a number of final recommendations for 
consideration by the designers and decision makers. 
The complete quantitative analysis of the 16 critical scenarios of the CHL has taken back to an acceptable 
level the risk estimated for 15 of them. The only hazard remaining critical is the Water Hammer scenario, 
whose Worksheet is reported in Table 5. In this case, the current level of design details does not allow to 
assess (via simulation tools) the plausibility of the occurrence of such phenomenon nor the extent to which 
the assets are exposed to its effects. This highlights the added value of the systematic analysis performed, 
which has enabled the identification of an issue that must be carefully addressed and verified in the design of 
the plant hydraulic system.  
Finally, a remark seems in order to underline that all quantitative analyses performed are conservative in that 
the assumptions made for the estimation of both the probabilities of occurrence of the accidents and the 
corresponding effect severities have been cautiously taken towards values larger than the expected ones. 
4 Conclusions and future works 
A methodology has been built on the framework of system risk analysis, to assess the economic 
sustainability of a CSP plant of innovative design with respect to the risks related to the occurrence of events 
that can lead to business interruption and/or loss of assets. The application of the methodology has been 
shown with reference to a real design currently under consideration for investment by Techint. The 
qualitative analysis step of the methodology, based on over-conservative expert considerations, has revealed 
the presence of 113 hazard scenarios, of which 16 are potentially leading to an unsustainable economic risk.  
The outcome of this step of the analysis has required a further step of detailed, quantitative analysis of these 
16 critical scenarios, for an accurate estimation of the risks they actually pose. The results of the quantitative 
analysis have shown that 15 of the critical scenarios actually lead to an acceptable level of risk. One 
scenario, that of water hammer, has been left open for careful considerations by the designers of the 
hydraulic system, for its prevention and/or the control of its effects.  
The introduction of detailed worksheets to report the quantitative analyses has proved to provide an effective 
tool of risk communication, clearly depicting the scenario, its analysis and outcomes, thus providing the 
design engineers with indications and recommendations useful for the improvement of the system reliability 
and the economic sustainability of the plant (e.g., attention to be paid in the hydraulic system for avoiding 
water hammers, sufficiency of one back-up Diesel engine instead of two, etc.); this can bring a significant 
added value. 
The proposed methodology is based on a top-down approach of investigation, which can be further 
complemented by bottom-up analysis (e.g., a Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis) for a systematic 
and complete search of initiator events. 
The methodology is also prone to tailoring for application to different technological installation sites and 
projects, leading to the perspective of its extension as a „Company Tool‟ for the analysis of the performances 
of plants and systems designed or installed in various fields of application (power transmission, nuclear 
plants, etc.). 
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Figure 1: scheme of the X-ITE through parabolic collector solar plant 
 
Figure 2: parabolic solar collectors 
 
 
Figure 3: X-ite trough plant block diagram 
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Table 1: Risk Matrix 
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Table 2:HAZID example 
ID Hazard  Hazard 
Manif.: 
design 
detail Level 
1 
Hazard 
Manif.: 
design 
detail Level 
2 
Hazard 
Scenario: 
Primary 
causes  
Hazard 
Scenario: 
Initiator 
event 
Hazard 
Scenario: 
Mishap 
Hazard Scenario: 
Effect 
Potential 
consequences 
(asset) 
Potential 
consequences 
(prod.) 
Init. 
Event 
Freq. 
[y-1] 
M 
(prod) 
M 
(asset) 
level 
M 
(tot.) 
R Existing 
safeguards  
30 Elecrical 
Energy 
Solar field Orientation 
system 
External 
events  
Failure in 
the 
electrical 
network 
longer 
than 4÷5 
minutes 
Overheating 
due to stop of 
salt 
circulation 
with solar 
field blocked 
on focus  
Trough failure 
and over-
temperature on all 
final collectors 
loops 
Rupture of 
tubes 
Loss of 
performance 
0
.0
30
0
0 
9
,0
00
,0
0
0 
8
,0
00
,0
0
0 
9
,8
00
,0
0
0 
7
,3
50
,0
0
0 
(H
ig
h
) 
Status signal 
of pump 
failure 
Skin high 
temperature 
alarm 
 
 Table 3: Critical Hazard List (CHL) 
ID  Title  Frequency  Severity  Risk  
30  Orientation system stopped  High  High  Very High  
20  Water Hammer  Very High  Medium  High  
125  Turbine Failure  High  High  High  
131  MV Switchgear tripping  High  High  High  
83  Low pumping (SG pumps)  High  High  High  
88  Salt solidification due to no pumping  High  High  High  
42  No pumping (Solar Field)  High  High  High  
90  Salt solidification due to no flow  High  High  High  
73  Steam Generator Internal Leakage  High  High  High  
124  Turbine Leakage High  High  High  
23  Salt solidification due to loop isolation  High  High  High  
24  Salt solidification due to prolonged bad weather conditions  High  High  High  
25  Salt solidification due to failure of three pumps  High  High  High  
26  Salt solidification due to short Power Failure (cold spots)  Medium  High  High  
27  Salt solidification due to prolonged Power Failure  Medium  High  High  
 
  
Table 4: example of Worksheet 
Project: 
X-ite trough parabolic collectors solar 
plant 
Worksheet 1 
System:  Solar Field SITUATION 
Component Orientation System opened on: 25/03/2010  
Number of HAZID 
Row: 
30 
confirmed on: 12/04/2010 
closed on: 10/05/2010 
Title: Orientation System stopped 
Hazard Type: Electrical Energy 
Description of sequence of events: 
 Black-out of the electrical network 
 Back-up system failed 
 With the Trough on focus the sun motion requires about 3.5 minutes to avoid any further 
concentration  
 The orientation system remains blocked on focus for at least 3.5 minutes with solar radiation above a 
level of 600 W/m
2
 
 Salt circulation is not possible 
Feared events:   
At component level No damages 
At asset level: Trough failure/Rupture of ¼ of Receiver Tubes (those ones at higher temperature) 
Loss of performance Large 
Possible causes: 
Failure in the electrical network. 
Level of severity: High Level of 
frequency: 
Very 
High 
Detectability: 
(yes/no):  
Yes  
      
SFP : (yes/no): NO Propagation 
Time: 
Yes   
Further investigations  
 
A more detailed evaluation of the asset losses and business interruption has been performed 
considering the different initial temperatures of the Receiver Tubes. 
 
    Temperature at manifold output [°C] 
   
S
o
la
r 
R
a
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
[W
/m
2
] 
 550.0 506.7 463.3 420.0 376.7 333.3 
200 0.15 0.27 0.40 0.52 0.62 0.66 
400 0.47 0.53 0.60 0.66 0.70 0.72 
600 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.75 
800 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.76 
1000 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.77 
          
   290 550 43.333333     
          
          
S
o
la
r 
R
a
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
[W
/m
2
] 
 Input Power per linear meter of mirror [W/ml] 
200 177.0 318.6 472.0 613.6 731.6 778.8 
400 1109.2 1250.8 1416.0 1557.6 1652.0 1699.2 
600 2053.2 2194.8 2336.4 2478.0 2619.6 2655.0 
800 3020.8 3115.2 3304.0 3445.6 3540.0 3587.2 
1000 3894.0 4071.0 4248.0 4366.0 4484.0 4543.0 
          
S
o
la
r 
R
a
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
[W
/m
2
] 
 Transition time toward the next temperature level [min] 
200 42.37 20.40 13.77 10.59 8.88 8.35 
400 6.76 5.20 4.59 4.17 3.93 3.83 
600 3.65 2.96 2.78 2.62 2.48 2.45 
800 2.48 2.09 1.97 1.89 1.84 1.81 
1000 1.93 1.60 1.53 1.49 1.45 1.43 
  
        
S
o
la
r 
R
a
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
[W
/m
2
] 
 Time to failure [min] 
200 42.37 62.77 76.55 87.14 96.02 104.37 
400 6.76 11.96 16.55 20.72 24.66 28.48 
600 3.65 6.61 9.40 12.02 14.50 16.95 
800 2.48 4.57 6.54 8.42 10.26 12.07 
1000 1.93 3.52 5.05 6.54 7.99 9.42 
 
Assumptions 
27 percent of time with solar radiation > 600 W/m2 
1900 modules of 12 meters 
1400 euro per trough + 300 maintenance = 1700 euro 
0.7° to exit from focus 
Solar angular speed NS .204°/min 
3.43 minutes to exit from focus  
       
   0.649              -      
  200 0.037              -      
  400 0.047              -      
  600 0.078         0.167            0.01  0.05 
  800 0.073         0.167            0.01  0.05 
  1000 0.116         0.333            0.04  0.14 
   1.000         0.667            0.06            0.24  
       
  1/4 of broken troughs     
       2,422,500          
      
 
 
The occurrence frequency of the event „trough failure‟ has been computed by the following Fault Tree (FT). 
 
  
where the failure rate and the mean time to repair (MTTR) of the „Diesel Emergency‟ event are given by the 
following FT 
 
Assumptions: 
a) There are two diesel engines which are back-up systems of the nominal energy supplier i.e., the 
electrical network. In particular, the two engines are arranged in a cold stand-by with perfect switch 
configuration (see [12]). 
b) It has been assumed that both diesel engines are periodically inspected with a period τ=3 months. In 
particular, inspection procedures (testing and maintenance) have been supposed to take 1h and be 
perfect. 
c) The probability of failure on demand, f, of the engines when requested to start is not known; thus, it 
has not been taken into account. This leads to an under-estimation of the diesel engines failure 
probability, but this is considered negligible. 
d) Common Cause Failures for the two diesel engines have been taken into account by applying the 
Beta-factor model with a conservative value of β=0.1. 
e) The failure rate of the electrical network refers to the Italian electrical distribution network. 
 
Results of the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):  
MTTFF=25276 103 h 
On this basis, the risk level associated to the present hazard scenario turns out to be acceptable. 
 
Given the very high value of the MTTFF, the FTA has been repeated considering only one back-up 
Diesel engine. The result in this case is: 
 
MTTFF=19990 103 h 
 
Therefore, even with only one Diesel engine the risk level associated to the present hazard scenario 
comes out to be acceptable. 
 
Recommendations: 
a) Skin high temperature alarm and the status signal of pump failure are safeguards only if they work 
even in case of power failure; thus, they should have an independent power source (e.g., battery). 
b) Evaluate the option of developing a system which in case of electrical black-out automatically 
moves the mirrors from the maximum radiation position. 
c) The diesel engine needs to be tested periodically (at least every third month). 
 
Signature and date  
 
  
Table 5: water hammer hazard scenario 
Project: 
X-ite trough parabolic collectors solar 
plant 
Worksheet 2 
System:  Solar Field SITUATION 
Component Pumps opened on: 25/03/2010  
Number of 
HAZID 
Row: 
20 
confirmed on: 12/04/2010 
closed on: 10/05/2010 
Title: Water Hammer 
Hazard Type: Fluid Flow 
Description of sequence of events: 
 Sudden pump stop 
 Creation of a water hammer 
Feared events  
At component level Failure (jamming) or sudden stop of the electrical supply 
At asset level: Damages of pipes, valves, pumps etc. 
Loss of performance Large 
Possible causes: 
Failure in the electrical network and failure of the back-up systems (diesel engines). Stuck due to grips, powders, 
etc.  
 
Level of severity: Medium Level of probability: Very High detectability: 
(yes/no):  
No 
      
SFP : (yes/no): Yes  Propagation Time: No   
Further investigations: Water hammer (or, more generally, fluid hammer) is a pressure surge or wave caused by 
the motion of a fluid when it is forced to stop or change direction suddenly. It can generate a very destructive force 
that can break or damage the pipe or even the equipment of an hydraulic system. It is caused by a pressure or shock 
wave that travels faster than the speed of sound through the pipes, brought on by a sudden stop in the velocity of 
the water, or a change in the direction. The FT reported in this Sheet can be used to compute the frequency of 
occurrence of a sudden stop of the fluid. However, two questions arise: 
1. The failure rate of the basic event „Spurious Trip Signal‟ is not known; 
2. A sudden stop may not generate a water hammer. 
 
Therefore, further investigations of the hydraulic circuits of the plant will be performed in order to verify the 
plausibility of the generation of water hummers and to suggest possible preventions and mitigation actions. This 
may reduce or even eliminate the risks related to the sudden fluctuation of pressure generated by the phenomenon. 
 
 
 
Signature and date  
 
 
